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Justice Traynor writing for a unanimous, en banc court, ruled that former Town of Newport (“Newport”) Police Chief Michael Capriglione could take office as a Newport Town Commissioner in Capriglione v. State of Delaware, Ex. Rel. Kathleen Jennings, Attorney General, No. 138, 2021 (Del. Oct. 1, 2021).  The Court overruled a Superior Court decision that prevented him from taking office.  The Superior Court ruled Town Commissioner Capriglione was ineligible for the office because his prior conviction for misdemeanor Official Misconduct was an infamous crime under Article II, Sec. 21 of the Delaware Constitution.  The Supreme Court held, however, that “under Section 21, only felonies can be disqualifying ‘infamous’ crimes.

Background

As previously discussed here on April 5, 2021, Newport elected Michael Capriglione to serve as a Commissioner.  Newport has a Council-Manager form of government with five Commissioners forming the town council, including the Mayor.  On May 19, 2018, while serving as Police Chief and on his way to teach a defensive driving course, Mr. Capriglione backed his police car into a parked car in the police department’s parking lot.  A surveillance camera recorded the collision, and Mr. Capriglione later ordered the deletion of the surveillance video capturing the collision.  As a result, a grand jury indicted him, and he eventually pleaded guilty to Careless or Inattentive Driving and Official Misconduct (resulting from the deletion of the surveillance video), both misdemeanor convictions.

The Constitution

The Delaware Constitution provides:

No person who shall be convicted of embezzlement of the public money, bribery, perjury or other infamous crime, shall be eligible to a seat in either House of the General Assembly, or capable of holding any office of trust, honor or profit under this State.

The Delaware Supreme Court’s Interpretation

In interpreting this provision, the Supreme Court analyzed the text, historic intent, and precedent.  The Court homed in on two portions of the text.  First, the Court noted that the provision did not include reference to “or misdemeanor,” as the impeachment provision does elsewhere in the Constitution.  Second, the Court noted the delineated crimes were all felonies or punishable by more than one year when the provision was drafted in 1987.  The Court also looked to the convention debates and found that the discussion focused on felonies.  The Court found “the constitutional text and the historical evidence of its understanding strongly suggest that Section 21’s ‘infamous crimes’ bar did not encompass offenses that were not felonies or punishable by more than one year in prison.” However, the Court did not find this dispositive and went on to analyze the existing case law interpreting the provision.

The Court discussed and analyzed numerous decisions from both the Supreme Court and the Superior Court that applied Section 21.  The Court concluded “before this case, Delaware’s Section 21 jurisprudence uniformly indicated that only felonies can be infamous crimes.  And although we have never explicitly announced this rule as a holding, we do so today.”  It is important to note, however, that not all felonies are…
Continue Reading Delaware Supreme Court Finds Only Felonies can Disqualify a Candidate from Office: Newport Town Commissioner Takes Office

On October 1, 2021, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of MG+M client The Boeing Company (“Boeing”) in an appeal of an order that remanded the case to state court. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s remand order and adopted Boeing’s argument that the thirty day removal clock is not triggered until “an amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper” makes the grounds for removal “unequivocally clear and certain.”[1]

The federal officer removal statute is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1442 and permits removal if: (1) the removing party is a “person”; (2) a causal nexus exists between the plaintiff’s claims and defendant’s actions taken at the direction of a federal officer; and (3) the removing party has a colorable federal defense.[2] 28 U.S.C. § 1446 governs the corresponding procedure for such removal and allows two pathways for perfecting removal:  (1)  if the basis for removal is clear from the initial pleading, the case must be removed within thirty days from receipt of that pleading; or (2)  if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, the case must be removed within thirty days of receipt of “an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.”[3]

In the underlying case, Plaintiff sued Boeing and other defendants in Los Angeles Superior Court, alleging that she developed mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos. Plaintiff’s Complaint failed to state any basis for removal, but Plaintiff later alleged that she was exposed to asbestos through the work her husband allegedly performed on Boeing aircraft while serving in the U.S. Marine Corps, thus triggering federal officer jurisdiction.  Boeing removed the case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), within thirty days of ascertaining that the case was removable.[4]  Nevertheless, the district court, relying on its interpretation of Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 2006), rejected the “unequivocally clear and certain” standard for triggering removal argued by Boeing, and concluded that Boeing’s removal was untimely because it was in possession of “sufficient facts” to justify removal prior to receiving Plaintiff’s amended discovery responses.  Accordingly, the district court granted Plaintiff’s motion to remand and awarded attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff, finding that Boeing’s removal was objectively unreasonable. Boeing appealed.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, finding that Boeing removed the case within thirty days of ascertaining that the case was removable.  Dietrich v. The Boeing Company, et al., No. 19-56409 (Ninth Circuit 2021) at 14.  The Court explained that the district court’s reliance on Durham’s statement that the removal clock begins to run when “sufficient facts” are disclosed was misplaced because it “does not tell us when the facts disclosed” are sufficient.  Id. at 13 (emphasis in original).  Its reliance equated “facts sufficient to allow removal with facts sufficient to require removal.” Id.  (emphasis in original).  To avoid such confusion…
Continue Reading Ninth Circuit Adopts “Unequivocally Clear and Certain” Standard to Determine When 30-Day Removal Clock is Triggered

On October 1, 2021 Governor Newsom approved Senate Bill Number 447 (“SB 447”) amending the California Code of Civil Procedure to permit damages for a decedent’s pain, suffering, or disfigurement to be recovered in an action brought by the decedent’s personal representative or successor in interest. Like many States, in California a cause of action that survives the death of the person entitled to commence an action or proceeding passes to the decedent’s successor in interest and an action may be commenced by the decedent’s personal representative or, if none, by the decedent’s successor in interest. As previously reported by the Defense Litigation Insider in September 2021 here, prior to the enactment of SB 447, California law limited the damages recoverable in such an action or proceeding to the loss or damage that the decedent sustained or incurred before death, including any penalties or punitive or exemplary damages that the decedent would have been entitled to recover had the decedent lived. Specifically, California law prohibited the recovery of damages for the decedent’s pain, suffering, or disfigurement in that action or proceeding.

SB 447, now codified as California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) Section 377.34 as amended, permits damages for a decedent’s pain, suffering, or disfigurement to be recovered in an action brought by the decedent’s personal representative or successor in interest if the action or proceeding was granted a specified preference under CCP Section 36 before January 1, 2022, or was filed on or after January 1, 2022, and before January 1, 2026. The amendment requires plaintiffs recovering under this statute to report their awards to the Judicial Council and the Judicial Council will provide this information to the Legislature. We anticipate that after a period of collecting this data the Legislature will revisit whether to maintain CCP Section 337.34 in its current iteration or consider amendments to same.

The new law goes into effect in January 2022 and reads, as amended, in full as follows:

(a) In an action or proceeding by a decedent’s personal representative or successor in interest on the decedent’s cause of action, the damages recoverable are limited to the loss or damage that the decedent sustained or incurred before death, including any penalties or punitive or exemplary damages that the decedent would have been entitled to recover had the decedent lived, and do not include damages for pain, suffering, or disfigurement.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), in an action or proceeding by a decedent’s personal representative or successor in interest on the decedent’s cause of action, the damages recoverable may include damages for pain, suffering, or disfigurement if the action or proceeding was granted a preference pursuant to Section 36 before January 1, 2022, or was filed on or after January 1, 2022, and before January 1, 2026.
(c) A plaintiff who recovers damages pursuant to subdivision (b) between January 1, 2022, and January 1, 2025, inclusive, shall, within 60 days after obtaining a judgment, consent judgment, or court-approved settlement agreement entitling the plaintiff to …
Continue Reading New California Law Expands Non-Economic Damages in January 2022

Senate Bill 447 (“S.B. 447”), which proposes a change to the current California law to allow recovery of noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering, after a plaintiff dies is headed to the governor’s desk after the state Senate approved amendments by the Assembly.[1] Currently, California Code of Civil Procedure Section 377.34 limits damages solely to economic damages if a plaintiff dies before judgment enters.[2] As amended, the bill attempts to alter Section 377.34 and would no longer exclude noneconomic damages if the cause of action or proceeding was granted a preferential trial date before 2022, or if it was filed between January 1, 2022, and January 1, 2026. The call for change in procedure comes after lobbying from interest groups primarily consisting of plaintiff attorneys, who stand to benefit if this proposed legislation is enacted.

After passing in the state Senate, the Assembly revised the bill to further limit the scope of S.B. 447 and added a reporting requirement for plaintiffs who received noneconomic damages between January 1, 2022, and January 1, 2025. In such cases, the plaintiff must submit to the Judicial Council, the policymaking body of the California courts, the amount and type of damages received. The Judicial Council will, in turn, create a report detailing the information for the state Legislature. On September 3, 2021, the Senate voted in concurrence with the Assembly’s amendments and ordered the bill to be proofread and prepared for Governor Gavin Newsom to either veto or approve.

DISCUSSION

Introduced by California State Senator John Laird (D), S.B. 447 has some compelling arguments in its favor and has received enough votes to advance.  The bill, however, also has dozens of registered opponents with several arguments against it. Proponents of the bill note that most states allow a decedent’s personal representative or successor in interest to collect damages currently barred by Section 377.34, and claim that defendants take advantage of the present law, which contributes to the influx of cases awaiting trial in California. Opponents cite the longstanding rules in California and argue that such changes in legislation are unnecessary, as there are alternative means to recoup noneconomic damages.

While proponents attempt to refute economic concerns that may materialize if the bill is enacted by arguing that similar legislation exists in a majority of states, California, having the fifth largest economy globally, has a complex economic system that may not necessarily be comparable to most states. According to the fiscal impact report by the Assembly Appropriations Committee, the bill could cost state agencies, including Cal Fire and CalTrans, hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars. Additionally, concerns over the impact the bill may have in driving businesses out [3] of California, while not formally addressed by registered opponents, certainly are valid considerations.[4]

Arguments in Support of S.B. 447

There are essentially three arguments made in support of S.B. 447: (1) that California is among the minority of states in the country that prohibit recovery for intangible damages or damages…
Continue Reading CA Senate Bill 447 Expanding Non-Economic Damages in Wrongful Death Suits on Newsom’s Desk

Defendants may have greater access to federal appeals courts thanks to a recent Supreme Court decision concerning district court remand orders. The Supreme Court recently settled a circuit split over the authority of federal appeals courts to review district court remand orders, as well as the scope of that review, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). In BP P.L.C., et al. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, the court held that appellate courts have jurisdiction to review all of a district court’s grounds for remand — not just those based on the propriety of federal officer or civil rights jurisdiction — where the case was removed, based at least in part on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442 and/or 1443.

The case was originally filed in Maryland state court by the City of Baltimore, which alleged that the defendant energy companies caused the city to sustain injuries related to climate change. Two defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland on several grounds, including federal officer jurisdiction. The defendant energy companies asserted that they were acting under the direction of federal officers in light of their alleged contractual obligations to the U.S. government. The city moved to remand the case, arguing that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

The district court agreed with the city and entered an order of remand, saying in part that federal officer jurisdiction was lacking. Immediately after this decision, the defendants attempted to secure a stay of the remand order from both the district court and Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Both courts, however, denied defendants’ efforts to stay the remand order pending appeal, finding that defendants were unlikely to prevail on appeal.…

Continue Reading Supreme Court settles circuit split over remand orders under 28 U.S.C § 1447(d)