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Meghan Senter

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Meghan B. Senter is an Associate with the firm’s Complex Litigation Group, based in the firm’s New Orleans offices. Meghan focuses her practice in the areas of products liability, premises liability, insurance defense, and toxic tort.

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“Insufficient evidence as a matter of law.” This language, contained in a brief one paragraph opinion in which New York’s highest court affirmed an appellate decision to set aside a jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs, describes the court’s rationale for determining that the plaintiff failed to prove her claims under the state’s jurisprudence. In Juni v. A.O. Smith Water Prods. Co., et al., Mary Juni pursued claims on behalf of her deceased husband, Arthur Juni, who was diagnosed with mesothelioma. Mr. Juni spent over 25 years working as a mechanic on automobiles manufactured by defendant Ford Motor Company, including work with brakes and clutches (“friction products”).

The plaintiff introduced evidence at trial that the chrysotile asbestos-containing automotive component parts utilized by Mr. Juni during the course of his automotive work was the cause of his mesothelioma. Ford, while not disputing the presence of chrysotile asbestos in its parts, submitted expert testimony that demonstrated the chrysotile asbestos contained in the friction products would have undergone a chemical transformation while subjected to high temperatures during the manufacture and use in vehicles, thus converting the asbestos into a benign substance called forsterite, which does not cause mesothelioma.

The jury found in favor of Mrs. Juni, but the trial court set aside the verdict against Ford, reasoning that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the verdict because plaintiff’s experts failed to refute testimony provided by Ford’s experts that chrysotile asbestos in friction products is converted to forsterite and rendered non-toxic.…
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A tale of two verdicts (1)Frequently as litigators, we are faced with questions about which factors can make or break a trial. The facts of each case and skill of counsel are obvious elements to obtaining a favorable verdict, but outcomes can also be heavily influenced by the venue, pre-trial rulings, voir dire, jury instructions and even the sheer whim of a jury.

Within the last few weeks, two separate verdicts came down in mesothelioma lawsuits. Both cases were heard in state courts, both cases involved a deceased plaintiff, both cases were brought by the same plaintiffs’ firm that specializes in asbestos claims, and both cases had only one defendant remaining at the time of verdict. However, one jury found for the defense, while the other awarded $81.5 million to the plaintiffs. What were the specific facts of each case, and what were the factors that might explain how two similar cases turned out so differently?

New Orleans, Louisiana

Mr. Thomas Hayden died of pleural mesothelioma in March 2016. He served in the Navy aboard the USS Edson in the 1960s, during which time he often worked in the boiler rooms. He later worked as a mechanic for a several decades, working on tractors, and, during this time, he also worked building scaffolding at various industrial facilities throughout South Louisiana. He alleged generally that he had worked with asbestos-containing friction products while working on tractors, and that he was in the vicinity of asbestos-containing products, particularly asbestos insulation, while he constructed scaffolding. Importantly, the plaintiffs in Hayden stipulated that they would not seek any damages for exposure to asbestos related to Mr. Hayden’s time in the Navy. Accordingly, the suit remained in state court.

Of the 72 originally sued defendants, only ExxonMobil, Corp. remained at the time of verdict. About 15 parties were dismissed via summary judgment, one (1) party was bankrupt, and the remaining parties settled or were dismissed voluntarily. Mr. Hayden was never employed directly by Exxon, but rather he allegedly worked as a contractor building scaffolding at an Exxon facility in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. He could not identify whether he worked on the chemical or the refinery side of the Exxon facility. He could not recall if the scaffolding he built was for new construction or maintenance. Nor could he recall handling any asbestos-containing products at Exxon.  Moreover, he could not identify the brand name or manufacturer of any products installed by other crafts. He could not even recall seeing any pipe insulation at Exxon. Finally, his work at Exxon was for a total of approximately one (1) week, sometime between 1982 and 1985.

Counsel for Exxon stressed Mr. Hayden’s inability to recall basic details about his alleged work at the Exxon facility, suggesting to jurors that this lack of memory was because Mr. Hayden never actually worked at Exxon. In closing arguments, counsel for Exxon contrasted the dearth of testimony regarding Mr. Hayden’s alleged work at Exxon with his ability to recall co-workers, supervisors, and products at other worksites. Counsel suggested…
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louisiana-890549_960_720Causation opinions from plaintiff’s experts in asbestos exposure cases have undergone a puzzling evolution as they continue to face successful challenges. From “every exposure” to “every exposure above background” and “every significant exposure,” each iteration has attempted to make the same end run around the plaintiff’s burden of proof by stating that all exposures in a lifetime work together to cause disease. A recent federal decision, however, struck another blow to the “every exposure” theory, adding to the growing case law debunking it as nothing more than junk science.

Under the “every exposure” theory advanced by plaintiff’s attorneys in asbestos litigation, each defendant whose product plaintiff may have worked with or around, no matter how infrequently, is equally liable. The theory claims that each exposure contributes to the development of disease, without making any attempt to quantify the specific exposures from various products. This is particularly problematic when you consider that exposures to asbestos from certain products may be so low that, taken individually, may not have resulted in disease. The “every exposure” theory glosses over these de minimis exposures with the opinion “each and every exposure” to asbestos contributes to the causation of disease.

Recently, federal courts have begun to critically analyze this “every exposure” theory, and to demand a more stringent causation analysis. In Smith v. Ford Motor Co, a Utah federal court found held that the “each and every exposure theory is based on a lack of facts and data.” Smith involved a plaintiff’s expert who opined that the plaintiff’s mesothelioma was caused by his total and cumulative exposure, with all exposures playing a contributory role. The court excluded that testimony, finding that the “every exposure” theory “asks too much from too little evidence as far as the law is concerned. It seeks to avoid not only the rules of evidence but more importantly the burden of proof.” Likewise, in Yates v. Ford Motor Co., a case out of the Eastern District of North Carolina, the court excluded testimony of another well-known plaintiff’s expert, finding that his adherence to the “each and every exposure” theory lacked a basis in supporting facts or data.

And most recently, in Bell v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., the Eastern District of Louisiana referenced the growing line of exclusionary opinions and stated that the “deficiencies of the “each and every exposure” theory of causation in asbestos exposure cases have been extensively discussed.” The court held that the theory is not an acceptable theory of causation because it amounts to “nothing more than the ipse dixit of the expert.” Though some state and federal courts continue to permit the “every exposure” theory, cases like Smith, Yates, and Bell add to the growing number of jurisdictions requiring plaintiffs to meet their burden of proof.
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