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Brian Gross has an exceptional track record of finding client-oriented solutions to complex litigation issues. Drawing on two decades of courtroom experience, he handles a broad spectrum of litigation, including products liability, food and beverage liability claims, asbestos and other toxic tort litigation, pharmaceutical and medical device claims, environmental litigation, as well as trucking claims, general liability issues, and business disputes for clients across the United States. Whether he is trying an individual case or managing national litigation, clients trust Brian to keep their best interests firmly in his sights.

Lady JusticeEver since the United States Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Daimler A.G. v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014), in which the Court held that general personal jurisdiction exists over a corporation only where the corporation is fairly regarded as “at home,” many plaintiffs and state courts have attempted to distinguish Daimler in an effort to expand the boundaries of a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction. It should come as no surprise then that the U.S. Supreme Court, with five personal jurisdiction cases before it and its Daimler decision seemingly under attack, ultimately decided to grant review of two such cases in 2017: BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. The Superior Court of San Francisco County, which attack the Daimler holding from very different perspectives.

As you may recall from your first year law school basics, personal jurisdiction requires, among other things, that the “the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).  This can be established through either specific jurisdiction, where the defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state which directly relate to the underlying controversy, or general jurisdiction, where “the [ defendant’s] affiliations with the [forum s]tate are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum [s]tate.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 748-49, 760.

BNSF Railway, begs the question as to whether a state court may decline to follow the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler, as The Montana Supreme Court directly challenged the limitations on general personal jurisdiction established by the Daimler Court. It did so by holding that the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”) essentially creates an exception to the “at home” requirements of Daimler.  The plaintiffs in BNSF Railway are two employees who seek damages from the company pursuant to FELA, which provides railroad employees with a federal cause of action for personal injuries caused by their employer’s negligence. Neither plaintiff resides in Montana, nor did the injuries occur in Montana. Yet, plaintiffs brought suit in Montana. Under Daimler, BNSF should not have been considered “at home” in Montana, as it is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business in Texas. Despite these facts, the Montana Supreme Court held that Montana courts could exercise general jurisdiction over BNSF.  The Montana Supreme Court reasoned that Section 56 of FELA allows a plaintiff to bring suit in any federal district court in which the defendant does business, and also confers concurrent jurisdiction over FELA suits to state courts. As such, the Court reasoned that state courts should have general jurisdiction in FELA matters over defendants in any state in which the defendant did business.  Tyrrell v. BNSF Ry. Co., 373 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2016).

As previously reported, in Bristol-Myers Squibb the California Supreme Court took a different approach to challenging the limits of the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 
Continue Reading U.S. Supreme Court to Weigh In on Personal Jurisdiction as State Courts Have Gone Rogue

California Supreme Court
California Supreme Court

The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler A.G. v. Bauman, 571 U.S. __, 134 S.Ct. 746 (2014), has played a significant role this year in cases pending in Delaware and Rhode Island. Most recently, the California Supreme Court has weighed in, changing what we thought we knew about personal jurisdiction, at least in California.

In Daimler, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a court can exercise general jurisdiction (whereby a state court asserts jurisdiction over a defendant on claims unrelated to the defendant’s activities in the forum state) only when the defendant can be said to be “at home” in the forum – the paradigm being the state in which it is incorporated or has its principal place of business. The California Supreme Court has now found a way to turn that decision on its head. It held in Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874 (Cal. 2016) that plaintiffs from outside California whose claims do not arise out of anything involving California can sue a non-California defendant in a California court.

Bristol-Myers argued, pursuant to Daimler, that it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in the California courts for the suits of 592 non-California plaintiffs. First of all, it argued that it was not subject to specific personal jurisdiction because none of the 592 lawsuits by non-California plaintiffs arose out of anything plaintiff or defendant did in California. Moreover, it argued that it was not subject to general personal jurisdiction because it was not “at home” in California, based on the fact that it was neither headquartered nor incorporated in California.

The California Supreme Court agreed that there was no basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction, but instead found that a “new wave” specific jurisdiction existed because Bristol-Myers engaged in “nationwide marketing, promotion and distribution [that] created a substantial nexus between the non-resident plaintiffs’ claims and the company’s contacts in California . . . .” And, according to the Bristol-Meyers court, the more wide-ranging the defendant’s forum contacts, the more readily a “connection” between the defendant’s forum contacts and the claims by the non-resident plaintiffs can be found.

This decision of the California Supreme Court appears to basically moot the Daimler decision and may make any company that does business nationally subject to personal jurisdiction in California. Bristol-Meyers has filed a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, so this decision may have a short shelf life. For the time being, however, companies should be prepared to litigate in California, as the Bristol-Meyers decision is likely to factor into plaintiffs’ decision when choosing a forum in which to litigate.
Continue Reading CA Supreme Court Offers Interpretation of Personal Jurisdiction Decision

Lady JusticeOn October 13, 2016, Presiding Justice Alice B. Gibney of the Rhode Island Superior Court ruled on Defendant Dana Companies, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction pending in the case of Harold Wayne Murray and Janice M. Murray v. 3M Company, et al., granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss upon finding that the court lacked sufficient minimum contacts to exercise personal jurisdiction – either general or specific – over the defendant. With this ruling, Rhode Island joins a growing list of jurisdictions that have applied the United States Supreme Court’s standard passed down in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).

The Murray case was filed in Providence Superior Court, and involves a Tennessee resident alleging he developed mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos through his work with and around numerous defendants’ products over the course of his lifetime, predominantly at locations in Tennessee and Virginia. The complaint filed in Murray named hundreds of defendants who allegedly manufactured, sold, or supplied asbestos or asbestos-containing products to which Mr. Murray was allegedly exposed, including Dana Companies, LLC (“Dana”). Dana subsequently moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims on the grounds that a Rhode Island court’s exercise of jurisdiction, either specific or general, would violate its due process rights pursuant to the United State Constitution as well as the Supreme Court’s ruling in Daimler AG v. Bauman and its progeny.

Specifically, Dana asserted that as the plaintiff’s claims arose from alleged conduct that occurred entirely outside of Rhode Island with consequences transpiring outside of the State, the court’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction was clearly improper. During his deposition taken near his home in Johnson City, Tennessee, Mr. Murray confirmed that he’d never lived in, worked in, received treatment in, or visited the State of Rhode Island. Absent a nexus between the plaintiff, the forum, and the litigation to permit the court’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction, the court’s review of Dana’s motion to dismiss turned on the question of whether there was a basis to exert general jurisdiction over the defendant.

The court’s general jurisdiction analysis began by citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown for the proposition that a court may reasonably exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation where the corporation’s affiliations with the state are so continuous and systematic as to render them essentially “at home” in the forum state. 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011); Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. and Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)).Upholding Daimler’s elaboration of this “at home” standard, the court reasoned that “with very limited exceptions, a defendant can customarily be subject to general jurisdiction in the state of its incorporation and the state of its principal place of business.” Going further, the court specified that evidence of a corporation’s continuous and systematic contact with a jurisdiction was relevant only to the determination of specific jurisdiction, and was not the


Continue Reading Rhode Island Court Upholds Daimler to Dismiss Claims Against Foreign Corporation for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

Occupational Hearing Loss (OHL) is one of the most prevalent work-related illnesses in the United States with 22 million workers exposed to hazardous noise each year, according to the Centers for Disease Control.

With approximately $242 million spent annually on workers’ compensation claims for disabilities arising from hearing loss, this number is set to increase in light of a new favorable holding for Louisiana employers with industrial workplace settings.
hearingThe Louisiana Supreme Court held in Arrant et al v. Graphic Packaging International, Inc. et al that defendant Graphic Packaging, which owns and operates a paper mill, box plant, and carton plant in West Monroe, Louisiana, is immune from suits in tort brought by its employees for noise-induced hearing loss injuries sustained from working around industrial machinery. The Supreme Court held that these injuries fell within the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act (“LWCA”) definitions of a covered “personal injury by accident” or an “occupational disease.”

“Arrant is the symbolic shot heard round the world in Louisiana when it comes to noise induced hearing loss suits.”

The Court heard testimony from expert audiologists that when high levels of energy enter the cochlea of the ear “it damages and destroys that row of hair cells in that particular part of the ear.” There is an “immediate injury to the inner ear” though the effect only becomes gradually perceptible over time and only with repeated or continuous exposures to high levels of noise. As such, the Court held that traumatic injury to the inner ear qualified as a personal injury by accident under the LWCA.

The Court also found that “hazardous levels of industrial noise . . . was a condition very characteristic of and peculiar to the particular employment of working in a paper mill or box plant” and as such was an occupational disease under the LWCA.

Caution-Hearing-Protection-RequiredThe legal effect of Arrant is that suits against an employer for noise induced hearing loss injuries are now within the exclusive remedy provision of the LWCA. The practical effect of Arrant is that noise-induced hearing loss suits against employers are coming to an end. While technically the LWCA provides an exception for intentional acts, this is a difficult burden to meet. Were plaintiffs to amend their petition to assert an intentional tort against their employers, they would have to prove that the employers either desired that their employees sustain noise-induced hearing loss, or were substantially certain that such injuries were going to occur from their work around noise producing machinery inside their facilities.

Simply, Arrant is the symbolic ‘shot heard round the world’ in Louisiana when it comes to noise induced hearing loss suits.
Continue Reading Noise-Induced Hearing Loss Claims Against Employers Fall On Deaf Ears

Note: For more MG&M analysis on Garlock, please see previous post by William Larson and Brian Gross.

The ramifications of the Garlock asbestos bankruptcy are just beginning to be felt across the country.  As new developments continue to play out, it is important to note that in each of the 15 cases in which Garlock was allowed to conduct additional discovery, the bankruptcy court found evidence that alternative exposures to asbestos were withheld.  This groundbreaking case has shed light on extremely valuable areas of discovery previously not pursued in a thorough enough manner.

The case has set in motion a new trend triggering discovery requests for all sources of exposure outlined in prior bankruptcy trust claims. Today, many different entities are seeking additional information regarding any potential withholding of alternative exposure evidence.

For example, Sindhu Sundar, writing for Law 360, reports that the bankruptcy court recently granted Ford Motor Company’s request to file a motion in federal district court seeking sealed evidence relative to other potentially withheld bankruptcy claims.

Meanwhile, the plaintiffs’ bar has pushed back on Garlock, arguing in a recent motion that Garlock knew of alternative exposures while hiding the evidence.  As a result, the Plaintiffs’ committee in the bankruptcy case has asked that the proceedings relating to the Garlock bankruptcy estimation be reopened, claiming that “Garlock has committed a fraud upon the court”—a charge Garlock attorneys argue is baseless.

In Los Angeles, California, Judge Emilie Elias, who has been appointed as the Coordination Trial Judge for all asbestos lawsuits pending in Los Angeles, Orange, and San Diego Counties, has set a hearing on disclosure requirements for bankruptcy trust submissions.  The plaintiffs’ bar has vigorously opposed many of the disclosure requirements, arguing they may file claims simply as “placeholders” to avoid the statute of limitations and such claims should not be discoverable under the attorney work product privilege.

Regardless of future rulings on the case, the proceedings highlight the need to conduct thorough investigation and discovery regarding all sources of exposure.

As Heather Isringhausen Gvillo noted in Legal Newsline “the ruling should do everything from assisting defense attorneys seeking access to asbestos trust claim submissions as well as fueling both jurisdictional and national efforts to require bankruptcy trust transparency through case management orders or even federal laws.”

The lesson learned in Garlock is that companies and insurers involved in asbestos litigation, as well as their attorneys, must insist upon the release of all discoverable bankruptcy trust claims information.  This will sometimes require vigilance and persistence since some plaintiffs’ firms are reluctant or unwilling to provide complete disclosure regarding these sources of exposure.

As always, diligent attention to discovery procedures is essential.

# # #Continue Reading Latest Fallout in Garlock Highlights Importance of Thorough Discovery of Bankruptcy Claims